Abstract-Greater American regulatory moving from federal to state governments has resulted in varying levels of environmental legislation and regulation. One example is the cap-and-trade system in California, which has been deemed a success in limiting greenhouse gas emissions as well as in earning revenue for the state. However, the coinciding production rates for polluting organizations has not been analyzed on a macro level. This study examined the air pollution and production rates of electricity organizations operating in California since cap-and-trade went into effect and found that since the legislation took effect, not only did production decreased slightly, but also, contrary to much analysis, the rates of air pollution from these organizations increased sharply.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enhanced regulatory authority in US state governments has resulted in disparate laws across states related to tax rates, drug laws, and laws affecting personal liberties, among other issues. This has also resulted in stringent environmental legislation in some areas and lax or nonexistent regulation in others, resulting in inconsistent air pollution regulations for industrial organizations. One innovative approach to limiting emissions is the cap-andtrade program in California.
Cap-and-trade has overwhelmingly been deemed a success in limiting greenhouse gas emission as well as in earning revenue for the state, but the efficiency of production for polluting organizations has not been analyzed on a macro level. Historically, inefficient electric utility productivity has been blamed on environmental regulations, but is this justified? Productivity in the California energy sector since the advent of cap-and-trade merits an analysis.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
In recent years, greater regulatory responsibility in numerous lawmaking areas in America has moved from the federal government to state governments [1] . Reference [2] indicated that local and state governments currently have a greater impact on the daily lives of Americans than the Published on August 28, 2018. J. J. Tanoos is with the Purdue University, Indiana, USA. (e-mail: jtanoos@purdue.edu) federal government. This is the result of a new phenomenon known as the devolution revolution, in which American state governments have established or reestablished themselves as powerful entities capable of spending time and effort on specific regulations and policymaking [3] .
In particular, this enhanced state-level clout has resulted in varying levels of environmental legislation and regulation [4] , [5] . Reference [6] confirmed that since environmental policy is now situated at the state level, non-uniform air pollution regulations and lower air quality standards have resulted.
Past studies of human activity related to climate change have concentrated on national-level issues [7] , [8] . Most of the older literature related to environmental legislation and tactics to reduce greenhouse emissions has focused on national policies because it was taken for granted that environmental policies were enacted through federal mandates. However, the changing dynamics of state regulatory politics calls for a new look at state-level air pollution data. In addition, the study of environmentalism as it relates to economic growth is gaining in salience in the literature [9] , [10] .
Carbon-related emissions drive pollution, and can take many forms, including carbon compounds such as carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide [11] . The energy market has been the focus of cap-and-trade because electricity generation produces 40% of carbon dioxide, an especially harmful pollutant [12] . Electricity is the economic sector emitting the largest percentage of greenhouse gas at 29%, followed by the transportation sector, which emits 27% of the total, and the industry sector, which emits 21% of the total [53] . Of all greenhouse gas emissions, carbon dioxide accounts for 81% (Center for Sustainable Systems, 2017). Carbon dioxide constituted 35% of all US energy emissions in 2016, with coal-powered energy usage comprising 68% of that total, followed by natural gas-powered energy usage comprising 30%, and petroleum and other-powered energy usage at or below 1% [14] .
The US state of California has had a history of state-level environmental regulatory policy [15] . California served as a laboratory for environmental innovation in the 1910s when the state's residents first developed hydroelectric power [16] . More recently, California enacted Assembly Bill 32 in 2006, which led the California Air Resources Board to adopt cap-and-trade on October 20, 2011, officially taking effect on January 1, 2013 [17] . This environmental program has been hailed as the "the flagship in an armada of global Unintended Consequences of California's Cap-and-Trade:
An Examination of Industrial Electricity Productivity since California Enacted Assembly Bill 32, the California Global Warming Solutions Act James J. Tanoos warming policies" [18] and called the "most aggressive piece of climate change legislation ever adopted by an American legislature" [19] . Reference [20] claimed that capand-trade is "a crucial piece in California's war on climate change". As an entire system, it regulates the second-largest amount of emissions next to the EU's system [21] . Under a cap-and-trade model, a government-issued cap sets a maximum allowable level of pollution and penalizes companies that exceed that emission allowance [22] . The California state government annually determines the mandated maximum amount of pollution emissions that applicable industrial organizations can emit, with a more stringent allowance every year. An organization may gain emissions allowances for polluting at annual rates under the cap and then sell them in the open market. These organizations can sell these emissions permits through quarterly auctions in the open market or bank them and use those allowances in the future to cover their own emissions [23] .
As such, the cap-and-trade system prompts a polluting organization to cut back on emissions or buy these allowances, also called "carbon permits" [24] or carbon credits for fair market prices in case they exceed the established cap [25] . The market mechanism is an important component of this process [26] , [27] . Carbon permits can be sold or bought like a stock, and there is a real-time market value for them much like a stock market ticker, and with prices fluctuating over time [28] . Electricity organizations were most likely to engage in these trades. The private market from which the carbon permits can be bought or sold has also been labeled the "carbon market" [27] .
Although this process has been used internationally, the cap-and-trade process in California has been called the US's "first economy-wide market trading system" to limit pollution [29] . The system has been deemed a success in part because it motivates organizations to make technological innovations to limit emissions: "if allowances are very expensive, the utility will be incentivized to make more expensive investments rather than risk having to buy additional allowances" [30] . As such, the price of the credits is directly impacted by the general costs of decreasing industrial emissions rates. From 2013-2015, cap-and-trade translated into regulated emissions in California dropping by 4% [22] . Through May of 2015, private sector auctions for the credits earned the state over $2 billion in revenue, which the state reinvests in clean air initiatives [17] . By 2017, there was a surplus of carbon credits available in the state [20] . Due to the success of the program, the state California extended cap-and-trade through 2030 in July of 2017 [24] .
California's cap-and-trade program regulations are most impactful on the power-generating industry, more specifically, the electricity industry. It not only regulates state's electric power plants but also large industrial plants, as it was written to apply to stationary sources emitting over 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually [31] . To put this into perspective, one metric ton of emissions is the equivalent of 2,400 miles of driving [53] . In 2015, the success of the program allowed it to be expanded to fuel distributors, and thereafter cap-and-trade covered 85% of California's overall emissions [32] .
Cap-and-trade has also had detractors, but to a lesser degree than its supporters. For instance, it has been said that fuel emission regulations have had a more profound impact on improving overall air quality than energy emission regulations and that special interests and lobbyists have had too powerful an impact on the trading of the carbon credits [33] . Claims have also been made that too many pollution permits have been given out and special interests have gained too much control [34] . An alternative plan to capand-trade has been a carbon tax on carbon-containing energy sources [29] , [35] , [36] .
Legal hurdles have also impeded cap-and-trade. In 2011, a court ruled that California failed to research alternative means of greenhouse gas reduction [29] . Environmental groups have sued the state based on cap-and-trade, claiming that the market mechanism in the program would lead to rogue polluters in their neighborhoods [29] . In response, the state created a greenhouse registry so that the public would know where rogue polluters are located [29] . Further, there have been "carbon leakage" issues, such as California companies deciding to produce elsewhere because of the stringent regulations [37] . Reference [27] stated that the trading portion of cap-and-trade "remains rudimentary at best".
Historical studies analyzing regulations on pollution show negative relationships between manufacturing productivity and regulations [38] , [39] . Further, environmental regulations have been blamed for inefficient electric utility productivity for decades [40] - [42] . More recently, scholars have also noted that California's cap-and-trade program did not take into account consumer energy rates and/or had a negative impact on energy consumers [43] - [45] . Recent scholars point to increased energy rates because of environmental legislation [46] - [49] .
There has not been stringent enforcement of cap-andtrade violations as well as EPA violations across the country. Out of 64,000 facilities around the US that have violated environmental laws, only 0.5% have been prosecuted, and most of these have only received fines [50] . The main reason the EPA and Department of Justice avoid criminal cases is lack of manpower and resources. As a result, they throw out many moderate and low-impact cases and focus only on high-impact cases.
Nevertheless, cap-and-trade will continue in California for the foreseeable future. Dissolving cap-and-trade would prompt immediate and unwanted increases in carbon emissions [51] . However, the political and legal debates over the unintended consequences related to cap-and-trade continue today. While it is true that the literature proclaims the overwhelming success of the program in spite of occasional detractors, particularly those that advocate for energy consumers, there has been no analysis of the negative fallout generally associated with environmental regulations, in terms of the general efficiency and productivity of those organizations that are being newly regulated. It remains unclear whether or to what extent productivity at previously efficient electricity-producing organizations has lagged in the aftermath of cap-and-trade.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study will examine the air pollution and production rates of electricity organizations operating in California since cap-and-trade went into effect. The number of total companies polluting in California was extracted from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a publicly-available EPA database that contains information on the release of toxic chemicals into the atmosphere and the waste management concentration activities reported annually by certain industries as well as federal facilities. In order to ascertain the types of electricity organizations polluting during the production process, any organization emitting "carbon" (using column AD, the chemical pollutant column, or the 30 th column of 111 total columns) was included in the subset, since cap-and-trade's carbon regulations are most impactful on the power-generating industry, more specifically, the electricity industry. Table 2 below lists the number of carbon-polluting organizations in its facility name or parent company name. This study wished to analyze composite air pollution. Providing assistance in this analysis was Nathan Byers, from the Office of Pollution Prevention and Technical Assistance at the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, defined fugitive air emissions as "all releases to air that are not released through a confined air stream including equipment leaks, evaporative losses from surface impoundments and spills, and releases from building ventilation systems, from Section 5.1 on the TRI Form R" [52] .
In order to compare apples to apples for air emissions, Byers suggested combining columns: "This will be taking into account what is leaving the facility via air no matter what the process is. In this way, you can fairly compare facilities in one industry to facilities in another" [52] . He indicated that the "Total Air Emissions" column was the combination of types of air leaving a facility. As such, "Total Fugitive Air Emissions" and "Stack Air Emissions" were added for purposes to create the "Total Air Emissions" [54] . Another focus of this study is the coinciding output or production rates of these organizations, Timothy Antisdel, Specialist/Database Administrator for the EPA described how production rates can be determined [52] . Antisdel noted that in addition to collecting air pollution rates, the EPA also "collects a production or activity index which indicates the change in production or activity at the facility from year to year", which are included in column DB. As such, average annual productivity rates (as they compare to their productivity from the prior year) for companies from Table  2 were extrapolated from the TRI. Table 4 below summarizes the average productivity rates of these organizations. In order to obtain a comparable method for assessing pollution as it relates to output, or pollution efficiency, variables for both pollution and productivity must be included. As such, the total air pollution, or the sum of the fugitive and stack air from Table 3 , was utilized as the numerator and the average productivity rates from Table 4 were utilized as the denominator in order to ascertain a "pollution efficiency rate". Since Assembly Bill 32, which led the California Air Resources Board to adopt cap-andtrade on October 20, 2011 officially took effect on January 1, 2013, analysis of pollution efficiency rates compared that from 2009-2012 versus 2013-2016. Table 5 shows the average production of carbon-emitting organizations both before and after the legislation took effect. The total production of those organizations decreased from .941 in the period 2009-2012 to .929 in the period 2013-2016, or a reduction of 1.26%% from the previous period. Table 6 below shows the average total emissions (fugitive plus stack) of the sample set of organizations both before and after the legislation took effect. The total emissions of those organizations increased sharply from 49,047 lbs. in the period 2009-2012 to 75,072 lbs. in the period 2013-2016, or 53.1% increase from the previous period. Since this study sought to utilize the "pollution efficiency rate" to ascertain production as it compares to emissions, the average production from Table 5 was divided by the total emissions from Table 6 for all companies in the sample set both before and after the respective legislation took effect, as seen in Table 7 . As such, the pollution efficiency rate decreased (got worse) at a rate or 35.5% from the prior period. Electricity organizations using coal and operating in California since cap-and-trade went into effect had to make some changes to their organizational models. This study found that since the legislation took effect, production decreased slightly as emissions increased sharply. These factors contributed to a notable decrease in the pollution efficiency rate.
IV. RESULTS AND REACTIONS
The history of inefficient electric utility productivity in California has been blamed on stringent environmental regulations. Reasons for the relative lack of productivity in the California energy sector since the advent of cap-andtrade should continue to face scrutiny.
